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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
so that there was actually contribution to the losses by each of
the associates, ergo, also an intention to contribute, although the
contribution was to be made in a specified way and manner.
There was here a community of interest in the business as such, a
sharing in the profits, and a measure of control in each party to
the contract. To this extent they were all principals who shared
in the profits, and they should have been held to be partners.
The net result of this case is a recognition of an anomalous type
of enterprise, not quite a principal-agent relationship, not quite
a partnership, but a principal-associate status hitherto unknown,
with no reason to recommend its adoption as another means of
attaining limited liability without complying with prescribed
statutory regulation.
In cases of this type, it would seem to be the policy of the Mis-
souri courts to recognize and favor a liability limited to particu-
lar property. There is no objection to allowing a limited lia-
bility where there is such a provision contained in the indepen-
dent contracts with third parties, but there is some question as
to the wisdom of a policy which in effect allows parties contract-
ing inter sese, by such contracts to limit liability as to third per-
sons, not the contracting parties. And although some argument
might be made in its favor in large group action, there are statu-
tory means of protection against full liability which should be
employed for that purpose.
If the intention doctrine which Missouri has articulated since
1922 is an unconscious divergence from the prevailing view, then
it is submitted that a conscious revision by the courts, or at least
a disclosure of the policy intended to be served would be fitting.
If, however, the adoption of the expressed intention and loss-
sharing criteria as determinative in the formation of a partner-
ship status is conscious and purposive, it is clear that the Mis-
souri courts are clinging to a doctrine foreign to the prevailing
view of Anglo-American partnership law.
STANLEY MORTON RICHMAN, '33.
THE MAIN PURPOSE RULE AND THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS AS APPLIED TO PROMISES TO ANSWER
FOR THE PRE-EXISTING DEBT OF ANOTHER
Where a statute passed to prevent frauds and perjuries is
actually used to enable a person to acquire a benefit and then
prevent any inquiry as to whether he promised to pay for this
benefit, there is an inevitable tendency of the courts to try to dis-
cover some way by which such a person can be forced to perform
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his promise.' The terms of the Statute of Frauds are all-inclu-
sive: ". . . no action shall be brought whereby to charge
the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriage of another person . . . unless the
agreement upon which such action shall be brought or some
memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing and signed by
the party to be charged therewith, or some other person there-
unto by him lawfully authorized."' 2 Under these circumstances
the courts have adopted various theoretical tests by which they
have endeavored to satisfy themselves that the promise to pay
the debt already owed to the promisee by a third person is under
varying circumstances not within the statute and hence need not
be in writing. It is necessary to examine these divergent funda-
mental principles in some detail as they serve to explain why the
courts of the various states have sometimes reached absolutely
contradictory results in dealing with the same concrete situa-
tions.
Historically the first attempt to formulate the doctrine that
under certain circumstances a promise to answer for the debt of
another was not within the Statute, was made by Chancellor
It is not the purpose of the present note to consider the merits or lack
of merit of the Statute of Frauds. It is sufficient to say it exists in every
state. Only cases in which the debt of a third person existed before the
new promise was made and is not extinguished by way of novation by that
promise will be considered.
; (1677) 29 Car. II c. 3 sec. 4. The equivalent Missouri provision is
R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2967. California, Idaho, and Montana have adopted
an identical statute covering the whole subject of this note and removing all
doubt upon the matter. It is made an express exception to the local Statute
of Frauds. It reads: "A promise to answer for the obligation of another,
in any of the following cases, is deemed an original obligation of the prom-
i-or and need not be in writing: (1) Where the promise is made by one who
has received property of another upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant
to such promise. . . (2) Where the creditor parts with value or enters
into an obligation, in consideration of the obligation in respect to which the
promise is made, in terms or under circumstances such as to render the
party making the promise the principal debtor, and the person in whose
behalf it is made, his surety; (3) Where the promise being for the ante-
cedent obligation of another is made . . . upon the consideration that the
party receiving it will release the property of another from a levy or his
person from imprisonment upon a judgment obtained upon the antecedent
obligation; or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether
moving from either party to the antecedent obligation or from another per-
son; . . . (5) Where the holder of an instrument for the payment of
money on which a third person is or may become liable to him transfers it
in payment of a precedent debt of his own or for a new consideration and
in connection with such transfer enters into a promise respecting such in-
strument." Cal. Civ. Code (Deering 1923) sec. 2794; Idaho Comp. Stat.
sec. 7977; Mont. Rev. Civ. Code (Choate 1921) sec. 8175.
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Kent by way of dictum in Leonard v. Vredenburgh,3 decided in
1811. The learned chancellor divided promises made after the
creation of the original debt into two classes: (1) where the
subsisting liability is the ground for the promise, although "here
there must be some further (or new) consideration shown, hav-
ing an immediate respect to such liability; for the consideration
of the original debt will not attach to this subsequent promise";
and (2) where the "promise to pay the debt of another is found-
ed upon a new and distinct consideration, independent of the
debt, and one moving between the parties to the new promise."
Elsewhere the chancellor speaks of the second class as embrac-
ing those cases where there is a "new and original considera-
tion." This consideration may be one either of benefit to the
promisor or of harm to the promisee. This rule is largely based
upon the English case of William v. Leper,4 but the views of the
majority of the judges in that case do not actually support this
rule. Indeed there was no real attempt by the English Courts
to lay down a general rule on this subject, as distinguished from
a decision upon the facts of a particular case, until 1902. 5 Back-
ed by the prestige of Chancellor Kent, this rule spread rapidly
over the country,6 but it has now been almost completely dis-
3 (N. Y. 1811) 8 Johns. 29. However, three previous cases had upheld
promises made in consideration of the release of liens upon authority of the
English cases, but without any attempt to lay down any general, guiding
principle. Kershaw v. Whitaker (S. C. 1794) 1 Brev. 9; Siav v. Pigott
(S. C. 1804) 1 Nott. & McC. 124; Slingerland v. Morse (N. Y. 1811) 7
Johns. 463.
4 (1766) 3 Burr. 1886, 97 Eng. Repr. 1152. Lord Mansfield and Justice
Ashton hold it to be a promise to pay out of a fund belonging to the orig-
inal debtor but temporarily in the promisor's hands. Justice Wilmot up-
holds it on the basis that it created the new promisor an agent of the cred-
itor and liable to account as such, while Justice Yates alone puts his opin-
ion upon the ground that it is a new and original promise. It is well set-
tled that a promise to pay out of funds of the debtor is not within the
Statute. Armstrong v. First National Bank of Bolivar (Mo. App. 1917)
195 S. W. 562; Gutknecht v. Sorge (1928) 195 Wis. 468, 218 N. W. 716.
Better precedents would have been: Tomlinson v. Gill (1756) Ambler 330,
27 Eng. Repr. 221; Croft v. Smallwood (1793) 1 Esp. N. P. R. 121, 170 Eng.
Repr. 299; Houlditch v. Milne (1800) 3 Esp. N. P. R. 86, 170 Eng. Repr.
547; Castling v. Aubert (1802) 2 East 325, 102 Eng. Repr. 393.
G By Lord Justice Vaughan-Williams in Harburg India Rubber Comb Co.
v. Martin (1902) 1 K. B. 778, limiting it to cases in which the creditor
waives a lien upon property or documents belonging to the promisor. A
similar view is followed in Vermont and Connecticut. Fullam v. Adams
(1864) 37 Vt. 391; Dillaby v. Wilcox (1891) 60 Conn. 71, 22 At. 491.
6 Aided by the elaborate review of authorities by Chief Justice Savage in
Farley v. Cleveland (N. Y. 1825) 4 Cowen 432, affirmed without opinions
by the Court of Errors (1827) 9 Cowen 639. Of. for examples Creel v. Bell
& Co. (1829) 25 Ky. 309; Travis v. Allen (Ala. 1831) 1 Stew. & P. 192;
Allen v. Thompson (1838) 10 N. H. 32.
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carded, still prevailing only in Arkansas 7 and South Carolina, 8
as an actual rule of decision, although it is frequently cited as
the law in cases which are decided under other rules, which the
courts do not always seem to realize are conflicting.
The courts have proved unwilling to continue so sweeping an
exception to the Statute as this, for it would take most cases of
promises to pay prior debts of another out of the Statute even
though the benefit or harm passing between the parties to the
new promise was comparatively very slight. In such cases the
inherent equities of the situation which tended to create the ex-
ception would not be present. The limitation most commonly
adopted is that announced by Chief Justice Shaw in Nelson v.
Boynton" in 1841:
The rule to be derived from the decisions seems to be this:
that cases are not considered as coming within the statute,
when the party promising has for his object a benefit which
he did not before enjoy, accruing immediately to himself;
but where the object of the promise is to obtain the release
of the person or property of the debtor or other forbearance
or benefit to him, it is within the statute.
Elsewhere in the opinion the chief justice uses a shorter and
more commonly quoted, but less exact, phrase to define the test,
"where, although the effect of the promise is to pay the debt of
another, the leading object of the undertaker is to subserve or
promote some interest of his own." This language has been
widely adopted as the proper rule, particularly in its shorter
form.1O The difficulty is that the two forms of the test are wide-
ly different in their emphasis. The first passage is primarly
concerned with the directness of the benefit to the new promisor,
while the second is apparently more concerned with his motive.
Massachusetts has been rigid in maintaining the requirement
of a direct benefit to the new promisor and a mere incidental al-
though certain benefit to him is not enough to take the case out
of the Statute.1 In Missouri it was settled in the leading case
Becker Provision Co. v. Parker Hardware Co. (1920) 146 Ark. 539, 226
S. W. 177.
1 Ellis & Co. v. Carroll (1904) 68 S. C. 376, 47 S. E. 679; but see Turner
v. Lykes (1904) 68 S. C. 392, 48 S. E. 301, which completely ignores all
prior precedents in South Carolina, while the first case is based upon a re-
view of these.
(Mass. 1841) 3 Metc. 396.
o It would serve no useful purpose to attempt to enumerate even a fair
selection of the cases adopting this test. It may safely be said to prevail
in all states in which a different rule is not specifically mentioned as being
applied.
" Ames v. Foster (1870) 106 Mass. 400 (giving up a lien on the share of
a part owner of a vessel which would prevent the vessel being taken to New
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of Walther v. Merrell,12 that a similar strict test should be ap-
plied. Other states while nominally applying the same rule
have stressed the intent of the promisor and have been content
with a far less direct benefit to him than would be deemed suf-
ficient in Massachusetts.' ,
This vagueness of the Massachusetts rule led to the creation
of still a third major doctrine by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Emerson v. Slater' 4 while apparently trying to
apply the Nelson v. Boynton rule, as it should since the contract
was made in Massachusetts and Federal jurisdiction depended
solely on diversity of citizenship. There it was declared:
Whenever the main purpose and object of the promisor is
not to answer for the debt of another but to observe [sic.
subserve meant] some pecuniary or business purpose of his
own, involving either a benefit to himself or damage to the
other contracting party, his promise is not within the Stat-
ute, although it may be in form a promise to pay the debt
of another, and although the performance of it may inci-
dentally have the effect of extinguishing that liability.
This test is really a compromise between the views of Chan-
cellor Kent and Chief Justice Shaw, for if the leading object of
the contract is of the right kind, a mere detriment to the promi-
see is enough. It must be noted that the object is limited to
serving a pecuniary or business purpose, while under Chancellor
Kent's rule the object might be of any nature, provided there
was a new consideration passing between the parties. This rule
is apparently in force in West Virginia'5 and Ohio,16 and in the
latter state has resulted in upholding contracts where there was
a detriment to the creditor,'7 but the benefit to the new promisor
York to be sold at a very advantageous price is not enough when the prom-
ise is made by the owner of the rest of the vessel).
12 (1878) 6 Mo. App. 370.
13 Prout v. Webb (1889) 87 Ala. 593, 6 So. 190 (profits of agency as buy-
er for debtor) ; Garvey v. Crouch (Ky. 1896) 35 S. W. 273 (influence others
to consign goods to promisor's warehouse). Texas has recently adopted a
variant of this rule by which the motive of the promisor is immaterial and
the test depends upon the subject matter of the contract. Housley v. Strawn
Merchandise Co. (Tex. 1927) 291 S. W. 864.
14 (1859) 22 How. 28. Explicitly followed in Davis v. Patrick (1891)
141 U. S. 479. Approved by Arnold, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (1927)
sec. 60.
I5 Howell v. Harvey (1909) 65 V. Va. 310, 64 S. E. 249. However, in
Hurst Hardware Co. v. Goodman (1910) 68 W. Va. 462, 69 S. E. 898, the
same court considered the facts of Emerson v. Slater and Davis v. Patrick
at length, but ended by applying the tests of Nelson v. Boynton without re-
alizing that there was any difference between them.
16 Grant v. Kinney (1927) 117 Ohio St. 362, 159 N. E. 346.
27 Texas Co. v. Seabord National Bank (Ohio App. 1926) 159 N. E. 842.
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was not direct enough to meet the test of Nelson v. Boynton. It
is not clear whether the words "object or purpose of the con-
tract" mean the subjective intent of the new promisor or refer to
the material thing effected by the contract. From the use of
the word "purpose" it would seem that they have reference to
the intent of the parties. In a few instances the intent of the
parties has been deemed controlling even where the intent was
not to obtain a pecuniary or business purpose, but rather to ob-
tain a result desired for reasons of family love and affection.' 8
Were this latter test to be applied it would virtually remove all
cases from the Statute as there would be such a motive for near-
ly every promise which might be claimed to have been made to
answer for the debt of another.
The situation in New York up to recently was chaotic. 19 Un-
der the influence of Chief Justice Comstock the earlier rule of
Leonard v. Vredenburgh was modified in Mallory v. Gillett,20 so
as to be practically equivalent to that of Nelson v. Boynton, say-
ing that a third class of cases where the Statute did not apply
was "where, although the debt remains, the promise is founded
upon a new consideration which moves to the promisor." Un-
fortunately, the decision says that the Statute covers all prom-
ises to answer for the debt of another. This language has
caused great confusion in the subsequent cases in the Court of
Appeals. In Brown v. Weber 2' and more strongly in Rintoul v.
White22 it was declared that the new promise must put the new
promisor under an "independent duty of payment irrespective
of the liability of the principal debtor." Although there is some
conflict and in the majority of cases the point is not considered,
this is probably true if it is limited to mean only that the new
promise must not be upon a condition precedent that the prin-
cipal debtor does not pay.23 Such was the situation in Brown v.
I, Koban v. Gordon Supply Co. (1929) 253 Ill. App. 569; Evans v. Shaw
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 268 S. W. 1037; Gleason v. Thaw (C. C. A. 2, 1913)
205 F. 505.
19 The authorities in New York up to 1920 are excellently reviewed in
Burdick, Suretyship and the Statute of Frauds (1920) 20 COL. L. R. 153,
160-182.
20 (1860) 21 N. Y. 412. In the important case of Kingsley v. Balcome
(1848) 4 Barb. 131, Judge Sill, while sitting on a lower court bench, an-
nounced that the true rule was that the promise is valid only if, as between
the debtor and the new promisor, the duty of payment is upon the new
promisor.
21 (1868) 38 N. Y. 187.
22 (1888) 108 N. Y. 222, 15 N. E. 318.
23 Yeomans v. Miller (1889) 33 Mo. App. 343; Rancil v. Krohne (1906)
31 Pa. Super. Ct. 130; Edwards v. Bryan (1926) 214 Ala. 441, 108 So. 9.
Contra: Heggie v. Smith (1899) 87 Ill. App. 141; Keyser v. Hopkins (Ky.
1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 968. In Davis v. Patrick (1891) 141 U. S. 479, it was
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Weber, but in Rintoul v. White the promise was absolute in
form; however, in the latter case there was no benefit whatso-
ever to the new promisor and the promise was within the Stat-
ute for this reason, although the court did not stress this point.
In Raabe v. Squier2 4 the same court held that the tests of Mal-
lory v. Gillett and Rintoul v. White were really identical and
upheld a promise although it was clearly upon the condition
precedent of non-payment by the principal debtor. The New
York lower courts almost universally disregarded Rintoul v.
White and decided the cases upon a consideration of the direct-
ness of the benefit to the new promisor.25 In Richardson Press
v. Albright,28 Justice Pound added to the obscurity of the subject
by the following reason for holding within the statute a promise
absolute in form:
But a promise may still be collateral even though the new
consideration moves to the promisor and is beneficial to
him . . . the inquiry remains whether the promisor
thereby comes under an independent duty of payment, irre-
spective of the liability of the principal debtor . . . it is
regarded as original only when the party sought to be
charged clearly becomes, within the intention of the parties,
a principal debtor primarily liable.
This was again largely disregarded by the lower courts.27
Finally in the case of Witschard v. Brody and Sons Inc.,28 the
Court of Appeals laid down still another rule, which if followed
will revolutionize the jurisprudence of New York on this subject.
However, the rule was announced in a very short opinion of less
than a thousand words. It cites and primarily relies upon Pro-
fessor Williston,29 saying:
considered that the conditional form would have been fatal, but the words
used were interpreted in the light of the circumstances to create an abso-
lute duty of payment. The majority view seems the better one as the new
benefit could hardly raise the promise higher than one made at the time the
debt was originally incurred and here the promise would obviously have to
be absolute in form.
24 (1895) 148 N. Y. 81, 42 N. E. 516.
25 The multitudinous cases are collected by Professor Burdick in the ar-
ticle cited in footnote 19.
26 (1918) 224 N. Y. 497, 121 N. E. 362.
27 Block v. Greenfield (1930) 137 Misc. Rep. 573, 243 N. Y. S. 177; May
v. Schneider (1920) 184 N. Y. S. 705. Contra: Gibbs v. Holden (1930) 137
Misc. Rep. 480, 244 N. Y. S. 10.
28 (1931) 257 N. Y. 97, 177 N. E. 97.
29 The first sentence of this is a direct quotation from 1 Williston,
CoNTRACTs (1927) see. 475. In the original the author continues: "If as
between himself (the new promisor) and the original debtor, the debt real-
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If, as between the promisor and the original debtor, the
promisor is bound to pay, the debt is his own and not within
the Statute. Contrariwise, if as between them the original
debtor still ought to pay, the debt cannot be the promisor's
own and he is undertaking to answer for the debt of an-
other.
The court cites isolated passages from Mallory v. Gillett and
Richardson Press v. Albright as justifying this view, but aside
from these Justice Thompson does not bother to consider either
the law of the subject or the practical application of the new
rule. Under this theory the creditor would be utterly unable to
tell whether a promise would or would not be within the Statute
as it would depend upon the relations between the new promisor
and the old debtor, which the creditor has no way of knowing.
This test probably is theoretically desirable if our attempt is to
reach a merely formal or strict interpretation of the wording
of the Statute, but this whole doctrine has grown up to reach
practical justice.30 It is fashionable to deride judge-made law
but it is surely even a greater evil for judges to repeal excep-
tions which have been sanctioned by generations of their fellows
when the sole reason for this radical change is to obtain theoret-
ical consistency.
In the present state of the case law upon this subject, the
courts, particularly the lower and intermediate tribunals, are
more apt to decide a given case by the narrow precedents which
are applicable to the concrete situation presented by it rather
than by a reconsideration of the fundamental principles. It
may be helpful to consider these situations in some detail.
Although mere forbearance to sue the principal debtor or to
foreclose a lien against his property would be sufficient consid-
eration for a written promise to pay, it is almost universally
treated as not being enough to take the promise out of the Stat-
ute, no matter what test is applied, unless there is some special
ly ought to be paid by the latter, whatever may be the other elements of the
transaction, the new promisor is on principle and in fact promising to
answer for the debt or default of another. The fact that he is led to do this
by consideration of his own ultimate advantage, do not make the ultimate
fact that the debt is another's any the less true."
30 Dean Arant would avoid this theoretical difficulty by invoking the
maxim that when the reason for a rule ceases, the rule should cease also and
limit the doctrine under discussion so as to be the following: ". . . a
promise is not within the statute when the consideration alleged to support
it is indicative of an undertaking by the defendant and of such a character
that there is no particular danger that the plaintiff may establish it con-
trary to fact by the use of perjured testimony." He admits that the courts
do not follow this rule with the exception of dicta in cases announcing one
of the other principles. Arant ON SUR=rYsHIP (1931) 114.
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relationship between the new promisor and the original debtor.31
It cannot subserve any business or pecuniary purpose of the
promisor or result in any direct benefit to him. Indeed, it
should not ordinarily be a new and distinct consideration, al-
though most courts following Leonard v. Vredenburgh have held
it to be such.32
A very common type of these promises is where the creditor
gives up a lien against property owned by the promisor in re-
turn for a promise to pay a debt originally incurred by a third
person. Such a promise may be made either by the grantee of
mortgaged lands or by the owner of a building under construc-
tion where the principal contractor leaves unpaid workmen and
materialmen who could file mechanics' liens, which are in most
states charges against the property and not merely against the
balance as yet unpaid to principal contractor.8 3 Such a promise
has been almost universally held not to be within the Statute, 34
although the continuance of such decisions in New York would
seem doubtful under the Witschard doctrine. In this class of
cases it would seem especially harsh to allow the use of the
Statute as a bar. Although there is conflict, it would seem that
the better and majority rule is to reach the same decision when
the lien is not actually binding upon the property, if the prom-
isee at the time asserts it in good faith (obviously the promisor
must have believed in its probable validity, or he would not have
31 Waggoner v. Davidson (1915) 189 Mo. App. 345, 175 S. W. 232;
Thomas v. Delphy (1870) 32 Md. 373; Duffy v. Wunsch (1870) 42 N. Y.
243; Dexter v. Blanchard (Mass. 1865) 11 Allen 365. Under the California
type statute it would be sufficient if the lien of a judgment for the debt was
waived or the debtor was released from imprisonment for debt in any state
in which this is still possible.
32 Decker Provision Co. v. Parker Hardware Co., above; Ellis & Co. v.
Carrol, above. Contra: McKinney v. Quilter (S. C. 1828) 4 McC. 409.
33 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3156. A statute making it a lien only on the
amount then unpaid to the principal contractor led to refusal to enforce a
promise to pay made by the owner in Alabama. Clark v. Jones (1888) 85
Ala. 127, 4 So. 771.
34 Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Early (1929) 222 Mo. App. 1118, 13
S. W. (2d) 1097; Hoag v. Boyle (1928) 125 Kan. 436, 265 Pac. 61; Monroe
Lumber Co. v. Bezeau (1916) 192 Mich. 307, 158 N. W. 880; Fish v. Thomas
(Mass. 1855) 5 Gray 45 (advancing in justification that it is in a way a
debt of the promisor's as it is a debt for which his property is bound);
Prime v. Koehler (1879) 77 N. Y. 91. Contra: Mathews v. Libbey Brothers
(1914) 42 App. D. C. 272; Hutton Brothers v. Gordon (1893) 2 Misc. Rep.
267, 23 N. Y. S. 770; Warner v. Willoughby (1891) 60 Conn. 468, 22 Atl.
468; Vaughn v. Smith (1885) 66 Iowa 579, 22 N. W. 684 (all of which
were cases of mechanics' liens under statutes which apparently made them
a charge on the property). Cases involving promises by mortgagees and
others than the owner are considered below.
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made the promise) .5 The same considerations obviously apply
to a promise by the assignee of the vendee to prevent a condi-
tional vendor retaking the chattel because of defaults in pay-
ments. 36
Another frequent occurrence caused by "shoe-string" financ-
ing, particularly in the building industry, is that the original
contractor is not able to meet payments due his subcontractors
who consequently refuse to continue work. The owner fre-
quently will promise to pay them the sums due and unpaid if
they will complete their contracts. Such promises are almost
invariably held not to be within the Statute,37 although, of
course, the subcontractors must be justified in refusing to con-
tinue work, or their promise to do so would merely be a promise
to do what they were already bound by contract to do and no
consideration for any contract 8 In such cases it is said that
the shorter interruption in the progress of the work is a suf-
ficient benefit to the new promisor.39 This is probably generally
true, but almost none of the cases undertake to determine wheth-
er whether it was true in the particular case. Another benefit
of more limited application is the advantage of retaining skilled
workmen. 41 The same rule is applied when the promise is made
by a mortgagee, 41 although here it would seem that the benefit
was very indirect, unless the mortgage was actually in default.
Cases in which the promisor has acquired an interest as partner
' Dybdahl v. Continental Lumber Co. (1925) 133 Wash. 81, 233 Pac. 10;
Cornell v. Central Electric Co. (1895) 61 Ill. App. 325; Joseph v. Smith
(1894) 39 Neb. 259, 57 N. W. 1012; Burrus v. Smith (1885) 75 Ga. 710;
Gardiner v. Hokins (N. Y. 1830) 5 Wend. 23. Contra: Rintoul v. White,
above; Tolhurst v. Powers (1891) 61 Hun 105, 15 N. Y. S. 420.
.;, Frame v. Whittam (1930) 181 Ark. 768, 27 S. W. (2d) 990; Barth v.
Sanders (N. Y. Sup. Ct., appellate term, 1908) 113 N. Y. S. 651.
. Winn v. Hillyer (1891) 43 Mo. App. 139; Garrison v. Lane (N. J. L.
1925) 129 Atl. 233; Roy v. Flin (1906) 10 Ariz. 80, 85 Pac. 725; Long v.
McDaniel (1905) 76 Ark. 292, 88 S. W. 964; Manetti v. Doege (1900) 48
App. Div. 567, 62 N. Y. S. 918; Wills v. Cutler (1881) 61 N. H. 405. Contra:
Belknap v. Bender (1878) 75 N. Y. 446; Lachman v. Irish (1893) 72 Hun
491, 25 N. Y. S. 193; and cf. Slotnick v. Smith (1925) 252 Mass. 303, 147
N. E. 737 (dicta).
-Snyder v. Monroe Eckstein Brewing Co. (1905) 107 App. Div. 328, 95
N. Y. S. 144.
' Manetti v. Doege, above.
40 Wills v. Cutler, above.
41 Higgin Mfg. Co. v. Bankers Mortgage Co. (1929) 128 Kan. 267, 277
Pac. 44; Mersereau Co. v. Wasburn (1896) 6 App. Div. 404, 39 N. Y. S.
664; Kleinman v. Auerbach (1913) 82 Misc. Rep. 436, 143 N. Y. S. 1033.
Contra: Ellison v. Jackson Water Co. (1859) 12 Cal. 542; Puckett v. Bates
(1842) 4 Ala. 390; Cavanato v. Piccirilli (1918) 184 App. Div. 640, 172
N. Y. S. 421.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss4/12
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
in the firm 42 or by assignment of all the profits are obviously
governed by the same principles.43 The benefits to the new
promisor are most apparent when he is a contractor, bound to
finish within a certain time, and the promise is made so that one
of his subcontractors can obtain the necessary material or labor
to finish his part.44
A more difficult problem is presented when the promise is
made upon the consideration that the creditor will sell further
goods to the new promisor upon the usual credit terms. The in-
tent to subserve a business purpose is clearly present and thus
the detriment in the extension of credit would be sufficient to
satisfy the test of Emerson v. Slater, but it is doubtful whether
there is ordinarily a sufficiently direct benefit to satisfy the more
widely adopted requirements of Nelson v. Boynton. To deter-
mine whether this is present it would be necessary in each case
to find out whether the creditor would have extended these credit
terms to the promisor without this extra promise.4" However,
the courts decide the question ordinarily upon their general con-
cepts of business practice without such an inquiry. The major-
ity of the cases hold that such a promise is within the Statute,40
but the more recent tendency seems to be towards upholding
such a promise, a reversal which has perhaps been caused by a
realization of the tendency towards stricter control of credit
extension. 47
42 1.'cPike v. Kardell Motor Car Co. (Mo. App. 1919) 213 S. W. 904;
Cuthill v. Harrington (1919) 185 Iowa 537, 170 N. W. 788.
43West v. Grainger (1903) 46 Fla. 257, 35 So. 91; Rhodes v. Matthews,
(1879) 67 Ind. 131.
44Newell Contracting Co. v. Glenn (1926) 214 Ala. 282, 107 So. 801;
Kelly Handle Co. v. Crawford Supply Co. (1916) 171 N. C. 495, 88 S. E.
514; Cooper v. Kelley & Kelley, Inc. (N. Y. Sup. Ct., appellate term 1917)
164 N. Y. S. 828. A similar rule was applied to a promise to prevent the at-
tachment and removal of property which the subcontractor needed to com-
ply with his contract. Moore v. McHaney (1915) 191 Mo. App. 686, 178
S. W. 259. The principle also applies to promises made to prevent filing of
liens when the pronisor has contracted to pay all claims of others. Mc-
Donald v. General Construction Co. (1911) 152 Iowa 273, 132 N. W. 360;
Stephen v. Yeomans (1897) 112 Mich. 624, 71 N. W. 159.
45 As was done in First National Bank of Dexter v. Crutcher (Mo. App.
1929) 15 S. W. (2d) 888.
46 Ruppe v. Peterson (1887) 67 Mich. 437, 35 N. W. 82; Pfeiffer v. Adler
(1867) 37 N. Y. 164; Martin v. Black's Executors (1852) 21 Ala. 721;
Winne v. Mehrbach (1909) 130 App. Div. 320, 114 N. Y. S. 329; Cardeza v.
Bishop (1900) 54 App. Div. 116, 66 N. Y. S. 408.
47 Maine Candy Co. v. Turgeon (Me. 1925) 130 Atl. 242; Davies v. Carey
(1913) 72 Wash. 537, 130 Pac. 1137; and cf. Hill Bros. v. Bank of Seneca
(1903) 100 Mo. App. 230, 73 S. W. 307 (continued sale of services upon
credit).
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Where both parties to the new contract are creditors of the
principal debtor, but one personally promises to pay the other,
the correct answer to the problem depends upon their prefer-
ential rights between themselves. If the promisee has a prior
lien on the goods in question, then under any rule, the promise is
not within the Statute. 48 If both parties have similar rights
and the promise is made merely to prevent a race to see who
could attach sufficient property first,4 9 the situation would seem
doubtful in theory if the rule of Nelson v. Boynton prevails, as
the benefit to the new promisor would seem quite indirect.
Where the promisor has the superior lien and the promise is
made solely to prevent interference with his plans to sell the
property, 50 the benefit is still more remote. Since the intent is
to foster the promisor's business purposes, both these promises
would clearly be valid under Emerson v. Slater.5 1
When the holder of a promissory note sells it to another with-
out indorsement but with an oral promise guaranteeing pay-
ment, such a promise has almost always been held to be not
within the Statute.52  Here there is clearly the necessary intent
and benefit under any rule, but the promise is conditional in
form and if made at the time the debt was created it would ob-
viously have had to be in writing to be binding. Since the mere
promise is all that a dishonest buyer would have to prove (the
sale occurred at any rate and does not indicate whether or not a
promise was made), it would seem that these cases are squarely
4h Simpson v. Carr (Ky. 1903) 76 S. W. 346; Rodgers v. Empire Hard-
ware Co. (1888) 24 Neb. 653, 39 N. W. 844; Weisel v. Spence (1884) 59
Wis. 301, 18 N. W. 165; Conradt v. Sulivan (1873) 45 Ind. 181; Hodgins v.
Heaney (1870) 15 Minn. 185; Arnold v. Stedman (1863) 45 Pa. St. 186.
Contra: Campbell v. Weston Basket and Barrel Co. (1915) 87 Wash. 73, 151
Pac. 103 (the court seems never to have heard of the main purpose doctrine
in any form).
49 Such promisees were upheld in Wallenburg v. Kerry (La. App. 1931)
133 So. 823; Sullivan v. Idaho Wholesale Co. (1926) 43 Idaho 149, 249 Pac.
895; Patton v. Mills (1878) 21 Kan. 163.
50 Such promises were upheld in Bailey v. Marshall (1896) 174 Pa. St.
602, 34 Atl. 326; Helt v. Smith (1888) 74 Iowa 667, 39 N. W. 81.
51 A problem analogous to that discussed in this paragraph is where an
heir to an estate promises to pay the debt if the creditor will not file a claim
against the estate (in situations where the failure to file has not yet result-
ed in a discharge of the estate). These promises have been generally up-
held. Kirby v. Kirby (1915) 248 Pa. 117, 93 Atl. 874; Day v. Morgan
(1924) 184 Wis. 595, 200 N. W. 382; Withers' Adm'r v. Withers' Heirs (Ky.
1907) 100 S. W. 253. Contra: Durant v. Allen (1874) 48 Vt. 58.
52 Barker v. Scudder (1874) 56 Mo. 272; First State Bank of Windom v.
McElwrath (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 266 S. W. 837; Swenson v. Stoltz (1904)
36 Wash. 318, 78 Pac. 999. Contra: Dows v. Swett (1883) 134 Mass. 140.
Such promises are expressly allowed by the California type statute.
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within the class of cases to which the Statute was meant to
apply.
Where the new promisor is to obtain any benefit solely because
he is a stockholder of the debtor corporation which is to be di-
rectly benefited by the actions of the promisee, it is generally
held that the promise is within the Statute as the benefit is too
indirect and uncertain.5 3 It would seem that here again the
rule of Emerson v. Slater would prove more liberal than that of
Nelson v. Boynton, but the split of the cases does not seem to be
determined by that or any other logical basis. It seems to make
no difference whether or not the promisor holds virtually all the
stock of the company,5 4 although it should in determining the
directness of the benefit in actuality. If, however, the promisor
also has some other relation to the debtor company, besides being
a stockholder, this other relation may take the promise out of
the Statute, as when the promisor holds an assignment of All the
profits of the debtor.55 Realistically this latter situation is no
different from that in which the promisor is the sole stockholder.
Under the rule in most states it makes no difference whether
or not the creditor or the original debtor furnish the considera-
tion.56 However, in Massachusetts and a few other states the
consideration must be furnished by the promisee.Y Where the
consideration is furnished by the original debtor, there is doubt-
less also a promise between them by which the receiver of the
property is to pay the creditor. In states which allow suits by a
w Bayard v. Pennsylvania Knitting Mills Corp. (Pa. 1927) 137 Atl. 910;
Freidlin v. Crocain (1918) 122 Va. 521, 95 S. E. 432; Sherwood v. Lowell
(1917) 34 Cal. App. 365, 167 Pac. 554; Roscoe Lumber Co. v. Reynolds
(1908) 124 App. Div. 539, 108 N. Y. S. 1018; Carleton v. Floyd, Rounds &
Co. (1906) 192 Mass. 204, 78 N. E. 126. Contra: Great Southern Oil Ass'n
v. Cooper (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 231 S. W. 157; Moon v. Greenlee (1920) 69
Colo. 482, 195 Pac. 1100; Washington Printing Co. v. Osner (1918) 99
Wash. 537, 169 Pac. 988; Goodling v. Simon (1913) 54 Pa. Super. Ct. 125.
54 Miller v. Denny (1921) 115 Wash. 635, 197 Pac. 936; City of Elkins v.
Elkins El. Ry. Co. (1920) 87 W. Va. 350, 105 S. E. 233.
5 Emerson v. Slater and Davis v. Patrick, above; Lindley v. Kelly (1914)
47 Okla. 328, 147 Pac. 1015; Schaefer v. Strieder (1909) 203 Mass. 467, 89
N. E. 618.
51 Harvey v. Bank of Center Hill (1922) 83 Fla. 55, 90 So. 699; Tasin v.
Bastres (1920) 268 Pa. 85, 110 Atl. 744; Rothermell v. Bell and Zoller Coal
Co. (1898) 79 Ill. App. 667; First National Bank v. Chalmers (1895) 144
N. Y. 432, 39 N. E. 331. A variant of this in which the consideration real-
ly comes from the creditor is where the creditor consents to this transfer.
Stone v. Kellet Motor Co. (Ala. 1929) 124 So. 412; Washington and Devon-
shire Realty Corp. v. Lewis Diamond Co. (1928) 263 Mass. 554, 161 N. E.
883.
57 Stowell v. Gram (1904) 184 Mass. 562, 69 N. E. 342; McIntire v. Schif-
fer (1903) 31 Colo. 246, 72 Pac. 1056.
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third party beneficiary, the creditor could sue on this promise
and avoid all trouble concerning the Statute.58 If the New York
courts continue to follow the doctrine laid down in the Witschard
case this will be the only situation of those which have been dis-
cussed in detail which will not fall within the ban of the Statute,
unless the creditor is allowed to show in addition to the contract
upon which he is suing some outside agreement as between the
new promisor and the original debtor.
From this examination of the practical application of the vari-
ous theories, it is obvious that the rule of the Witschard case
would lead to very unjust results in many instances, unless we
assume that the alleged promise was never made in each case, an
assumption which would make the creditor's conduct very diffi-
cult to explain upon any rational ground. It is probably hope-
less to urge that the states should adopt the more flexible rule of
Emerson v. Slater instead of the well intrenched doctrine of
Nelson v. Boynton. But it would seem desirable that the courts be
less rigid and formalistic in determining what is a direct benefit
and should pay more attention to the facts of each particu-
lar case rather than feel bound by precedents in generally, but
not exactly, similar situations. Under this rule a person would
not be allowed to obtain a benefit and then avoid fulfilling the
arrangement by which he obtained it, while greater solemnity
would be required in those cases where it is particularly need-
ed-where the promise is supported by a legal but not a bene-
ficial consideration. The reduction of such promises to writing
impresses upon the promisor a clearer conception of what he is
doing and may lead him to reconsider an ill-advised decision.
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS, '33.
5h Davis v. Faulkner (1923) 186 N. C. 439, 119 S. E. 819; Wolf v. Koppel
(N. Y. 1843) 5 Hill 458.
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